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Abstract
Since the introduction of the stable marriage problem (SMP) by Gale and Shapley (1962),
several variants and extensions have been investigated. While this variety is useful to
widen the application potential, each variant requires a new algorithm for finding the
stable matchings. To address this issue, we propose an encoding of the SMP using answer
set programming (ASP), which can straightforwardly be adapted and extended to suit
the needs of specific applications. The use of ASP also means that we can take advantage
of highly efficient off-the-shelf solvers. To illustrate the flexibility of our approach, we
show how our ASP encoding naturally allows us to select optimal stable matchings, i.e.
matchings that are optimal according to some user-specified criterion. To the best of our
knowledge, our encoding offers the first exact implementation to find sex-equal, minimum
regret, egalitarian or maximum cardinality stable matchings for SMP instances in which
individuals may designate unacceptable partners and ties between preferences are allowed.
KEYWORDS: Answer Set Programming, Logic Rules, Stable Marriage Problem, Optimal
Stable Matchings
1 Introduction
The stable marriage problem (SMP) is a well-known matching problem introduced
by Gale and Shapley (1962). The input of an SMP instance consists of (i) a set
of n men and n women, (ii) for each man a ranking of the women as preferred
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partners, and (iii) for each woman a ranking of the men as preferred partners.
A blocking pair of an SMP instance consists of a man and a woman who are in
different marriages but both prefer each other to their actual partners. Given the
problem, one can compute a stable matching or stable set of marriages, which is
defined as a set of n couples (marriages) such that there are no blocking pairs.
Due to its practical relevance, countless variants on the SMP have been investi-
gated, enabling a wider range of applications. Examples of such applications include
the kidney-exchange problem (Irving 2007), which matches donors in incompatible
donor-recipient pairs to compatible recipients in other incompatible pairs and vice
versa, and the hospital-resident problem (Manlove et al. 2002), which matches res-
idents to the free positions in hospitals. In 2012, Roth and Shapley won the Nobel
Prize for Economics for their theory of stable allocations and the practice of market
design, which directly resulted from an application of the SMP.
In the literature, typically each time a new variant or generalization of the SMP or
a different optimality criterion is considered, a new algorithm is developed; see e.g.
(Gusfield 1987; Irving et al. 1987; McDermid and Irving 2012), or (Manlove 2013)
for an overview. In this paper, we propose to use answer set programming (ASP) as
a general vehicle for modeling a large class of extensions and variations of the SMP.
We show how ASP encodings can be used to compute stable matchings, and how this
encoding can be extended to compute optimal stable matchings. Although the SMP
has been widely investigated, and efficient approximation or exact algorithms are
available for several of its variants (Iwama et al. 2010; McDermid and Irving 2012),
to the best of our knowledge, our encoding offers the first exact implementation to
find sex-equal, minimum regret, egalitarian or maximum cardinality stable match-
ings for SMP instances with unacceptable partners and ties (see below).
In this paper, we will consider two well-known adaptions of the SMP. First, we will
consider problem instances in which every person can specify a set of unacceptable
partners. The second alteration consists of allowing ties in the preferences, i.e. one
can be indifferent between some possible partners. In the literature, the SMP variant
with unacceptable partners – or, equivalently, with incomplete preference lists – is
abbreviated as SMI. The variant with ties is denoted as SMT and the variant which
allows both extensions as SMTI. Note that the original SMP is a special case of
the SMTI, i.e. the set of unacceptable partners is empty for each man and woman,
and there are no ties. Therefore, our paper focusses on the SMTI variant, as it is
the most general one.
Another way to generalize the SMP is by introducing optimality criteria for
stable matchings. This is motivated by the fact that, if multiple stable match-
ings exist, some may be more interesting than others. In this paper, we focus on
sex-equality, minimum regret, egalitarity and maximum cardinality of the stable
matchings, as these are commonly investigated optimality criteria in the match-
ing literature. Note, however, that there exist several other optimality criteria
in the context of matchings, such as popularity (Ga¨rdenfors 1975), Pareto opti-
mality (Gale and Sotomayor 1985; Roth and Sotomayor 1990) or profile-based no-
tions such as rank-maximum (Irving 2003), greedy maximum and generous max-
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imum (Irving 2003). As this list is non-exhaustive, we refer the interested reader
to (Manlove 2013) for an overview.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First we give some background about the
SMP and ASP in Section 2. Then we introduce our encoding of the SMTI with ASP
and prove its correctness in Section 3.1. To illustrate the flexibility of the approach,
we show how it can be used to tackle three-dimensional stable matching problems
in Section 3.2. In Section 4, we first discuss several optimality criteria and then
extend the encoding from Section 3.1, enabling us to find optimal stable matchings.
We show how optimal stable matchings of an SMTI instance can be found by solving
the corresponding induced disjunctive ASP program and prove the soundness of
our approach. This paper is an extended version of (De Clercq et al. 2013) and
additionally provides detailed examples, complete correctness proofs and an ASP
encoding of the three-dimensional stable matching problem. The three-dimensional
stable matching problem is very important for practical applications, such as the
kidney exchange program (Biro´ and McDermid 2010).
2 Background
2.1 The Stable Marriage Problem
To solve the original SMP, Gale and Shapley (Gale and Shapley 1962) constructed
an iterative algorithm —known as the Gale-Shapley algorithm, G-S algorithm or
deferred-acceptance algorithm— to compute a particular stable matching of an
SMP instance. The algorithm works as follows: in round 1 every man proposes to
his first choice of all women. A woman, when being proposed, then rejects all men
but her first choice among the subset of men who proposed to her. That first choice
becomes her temporary husband. In the next rounds, all rejected men propose to
their first choice among the subset of women by whom they were not rejected yet,
regardless of whether this woman already has a temporary husband. Each woman,
when being proposed, then rejects all men but her first choice among the subset
of men who just proposed to her and her temporary mate. This process continues
until all women have a husband. This point, when everyone has a partner, is always
reached after a polynomial number of steps and the corresponding set of marriages
is stable (Gale and Shapley 1962). It should be noted, however, that only one of
the potentially exponentially many stable matchings is found in this way.
The classical SMP can be generalized by (i) allowing men and women to point out
unacceptable partners, i.e. exclude them from their preference list and (ii) dropping
the restriction that the number of men n equals the number of women p. In this
variant, men and women can remain single in a stable matching. Intuitively, one
prefers remaining single over being matched with an unacceptable partner. This
variant is also referred to as the SMP with incomplete preference lists, abbreviated
as SMI. A stable matching for an SMI instance always exists and can be found in
polynomial time (Roth and Sotomayor 1990) by a slightly modified G-S algorithm.
As we focus on an extension of the SMI, we refer to the online appendix for the
formal definitions of the classical SMP and the SMI.
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The SMI variant can further be generalized by additionally allowing ties in the
preference lists. For this variant (SMTI) there are several ways to define stability,
but we will use the notion of weak stability (Irving 1994). We denote a set of men
as M = {m1, . . . ,mn} and a set of women W = {w1, . . . , wp}. A set of marriages
or a matching is a collection of man-woman pairs and singles (persons paired to
themselves) such that every man and every woman occurs in just one pair.
Definition 1 (SMTI )
An instance of the SMTI is a pair (SM , SW ) with SM = {σ1M , . . . , σ
n
M} and SW =
{σ1W , . . . , σ
p
W }. For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, σ
i
M is a list of disjoint subsets of {1, . . . , p}.
Symmetrically σiW is a list of disjoint subsets of {1, . . . , n} for every i ∈ {1, . . . , p}.
We call σiM and σ
i
W the preferences of man mi and woman wi respectively and
we denote the length of the list σiM as |σ
i
M |. If k ∈ σ
i
M (j), woman wk is in man
mi’s j
th most preferred group of women. All the women in that group are equally
preferred by mi. The case k ∈ σiW (j) is similar. If there is no l such that j ∈ σ
i
M (l),
woman wj is an unacceptable partner for man mi, and similarly when there is no
l such that j ∈ σiW (l). For every k in the set σ
i
M (|σ
i
M |), man mi equally prefers
staying single to being paired to woman wk, and symmetrically for the preferences
of a woman wi. This is the only set in σ
i
M that might be empty, and similar for
σiW . Man m and woman w form a blocking pair in a set of marriages S if m strictly
prefers w to his partner in S and w strictly prefersm to her partner in S. A blocking
individual in S is a person who stricly prefers being single to being paired to his
partner in S. A weakly stable matching is a set of marriages without blocking pairs
or individuals.
A weakly stable matching always exists for an instance of the SMTI and it can be
found in polynomial time by arbitrarily breaking the ties (Iwama and Miyazaki 2008).
However, as opposed to the SMI variant, the number of matched persons is no longer
constant for every stable matching in this variant.
We introduce the following notations:
acceptableiM = σ
i
M (1) ∪ σ
i
M (2) ∪ . . . ∪ σ
i
M (|σ
i
M | − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= preferred iM
∪ σiM (|σ
i
M |)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= neutraliM
Furthermore unacceptableiM = {1, . . . , p} \ acceptable
i
M . We define the ordering
≤miM on {wj | j ∈ acceptable
i
M} ∪ {mi} as x ≤
mi
M y iff mi prefers person x at least
as much as person y. Note that mi is included in its own preference ordering to
encode the possibility of staying single. The strict ordering <miM is defined in the
obvious way and analogous notations are used for σjW .
Example 1
SupposeM = {m1,m2},W = {w1, w2, w3, w4} and SM = {σ1M = ({1, 3}, {4}), σ
2
M
= ({2, 3}, {})}. Hence manm1 prefers women w1 and w3 to woman w4. There is a tie
between woman w1 and w3 as well as between woman w4 and staying single. Woman
w2 is unacceptable for man m1. Man m2 prefers woman w2 and w3 to staying
single, but finds w1 and w4 unacceptable. It holds that w1 <
m1
M m1, i.e. m1 prefers
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marrying w1 over staying single, acceptable
1
M = {1, 3, 4}, preferred
1
M = {1, 3},
neutral1M = {4} and unacceptable
1
M = {2}.
2.2 Answer Set Programming
Answer set programming or ASP is a form of declarative programming (Brewka et al. 2011).
Its transparence, elegance and ability to deal with ΣP2 -complete problems make it
an attractive method for solving combinatorial search and optimization problems.
An ASP program is a finite collection of first-order rules
A1 ∨ . . . ∨ Ak ← B1, . . . , Bm, not C1, . . . , not Cn
where A1, . . . , Ak, B1, . . . , Bm, C1, . . . , Cn are predicates, possibly negated by ¬,
and not is the negation-as-failure operator, whose meaning is explained below.
The semantics are defined by the ground version of the program, consisting of
all ground instantiations of the rules w.r.t. the constants that appear in it (see e.g.
(Brewka et al. 2011) for a good overview). This grounded program is a propositional
ASP program. The building blocks of these programs are atoms, literals and rules.
The most elementary are atoms, which are propositional variables that can be
true or false. A literal is an atom or a negated atom, denoted with ¬. Beside
strong negation, ASP uses a special kind of negation, namely negation-as-failure
(naf), denoted with ‘not’. For a literal a we call ‘not a’ the naf-literal associated
with a. The extended literals consist of all literals and their associated naf-literals.
A disjunctive rule has the following form
a1 ∨ . . . ∨ ak ← b1, . . . , bm, not c1, . . . , not cn
where a1, . . . , ak, b1, . . . , bm, c1, . . . , cn are literals from a fixed set L, determined
by a fixed set A of atoms. We call a1 ∨ . . . ∨ ak the head of the rule while the
set of extended literals b1, . . . , bm, not c1, . . ., not cn is called the body. The rule
above intuitively encodes that a1, a2, . . . or ak is true when we have evidence that
b1, . . . , bm are true and we have no evidence that at least one of c1, . . . , cn is true.
When a rule has an empty body, we call it a fact ; when the head is empty, we speak
of a constraint. A rule without occurrences of not is called a simple disjunctive rule.
A simple disjunctive ASP program is a finite collection of simple disjunctive rules
and similarly a disjunctive ASP program P is a finite collection of disjunctive rules.
If each rule head consists of at most one literal, we speak of a normal ASP program.
We define an interpretation I of a disjunctive ASP program P as a subset of L.
An interpretation I satisfies a simple disjunctive rule a1 ∨ . . . ∨ ak ← b1, . . . , bm
when a1 ∈ I or a2 ∈ I or . . . or ak ∈ I or {b1, . . . , bm} 6⊆ I. An interpreta-
tion which satisfies all rules of a simple disjunctive program is called a model
of that program. An interpretation I is an answer set of a simple disjunctive
program P iff it is a minimal model of P , i.e. no strict subset of I is a model
of P (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988). The reduct PI of a disjunctive ASP program
P w.r.t. an interpretation I is defined as the simple disjunctive ASP program
PI = {a1 ∨ . . . ∨ ak ← b1, . . . , bm | (a1 ∨ . . . ∨ ak ← b1, . . . , bm, not c1, . . . , not cn) ∈
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P , {c1, . . . , cn} ∩ I = ∅}. An interpretation I of a disjunctive ASP program P is an
answer set of P iff I is an answer set of PI .
Example 2
Let P be the ASP program with the following 4 rules:
man(john)←, person(john)←, person(fiona)←
woman(X) ∨ child(X)← person(X), notman(X)
The first 3 rules are facts; hence their heads will be in any answer set. The fourth
rule encodes that any person who is not a man, is a woman or child. The latter rule
is grounded to 2 rules in whichX is resp. replaced by john and fiona. We check that
the interpretation I = {man(john), woman(fiona), person(john), person(fiona)}
is an answer set of the ground version of P by computing the reduct PI . As the
grounded rule with X = john is deleted since man(john) is in I, PI is:
man(john)←, person(john)←, person(fiona)←
woman(fiona) ∨ child(fiona)← person(fiona)
It is clear that I is a minimal model of this simple program, so I is an answer
set of P . By replacing woman(fiona) by child(fiona) in I, another answer set is
obtained.
To automatically compute the answer sets of the programs in this paper, we have
used the ASP solver DLV (www.dlvsystem.com), due to its ability to handle predi-
cates, disjunction and numeric values, with built-in aggregate functions (Faber et al. 2008).
The numeric values are only used for grounding.
3 Modeling the Stable Marriage Problem in ASP
3.1 Modeling the SMTI in ASP
In this section we model the SMTI, using ASP. A few proposals of using non-
monotonic reasoning for modeling the SMP have already been described in the
literature. For instance, in (Marek et al. 1990) a specific variant of the SMP is men-
tioned (in which boys each know a subset of a set of girls and want to be matched
to a girl they know) and in (Dung 1995) an abductive program is used to find a
stable matching of marriages in which two fixed persons are paired, with strict,
complete preference lists. To the best of our knowledge, beyond a few specific ex-
amples, no comprehensive study has been made of using ASP or related paradigms
in this context. In particular, the generality of our ASP framework for weakly sta-
ble matchings of SMTI instances allows to easily adjust the encoding to variants of
the SMP, such as the stable roommate problem (Gale and Shapley 1962), in which
matches need to be found within one group instead of between two groups, or
the three-dimensional stable matching problem (Ng and Hirschberg 1991), which
matches triples between three groups instead of pairs between two.
The expression accept(m,w) denotes that a man m and a woman w accept each
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other as partners. The predicate manpropose(m,w) expresses that man m is will-
ing to propose to woman w and analogously womanpropose(m,w) expresses that
woman w is willing to propose to man m. Inspired by the Gale-Shapley algorithm,
we look for an ASP formalization to find the stable matchings.
Definition 2 (ASP program induced by SMTI )
The ASP program P induced by an instance ({σ1M , . . . , σ
n
M}, {σ
1
W , . . . , σ
p
W }) of the
SMTI is the program containing for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, . . . , p} the following
rules:
accept(mi, wj)← manpropose(mi, wj), womanpropose(mi, wj) (1)
accept(mi,mi)← {not accept(mi, wk) | k ∈ acceptable
i
M} (2)
accept(wj, wj)← {not accept(mk, wj) | k ∈ acceptable
j
W} (3)
and for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ acceptableiM :
manpropose(mi, wj)← {not accept(mi, x) |x ≤
mi
M wj and wj 6= x} (4)
and for every j ∈ {1, . . . , p}, i ∈ acceptablejW :
womanpropose(mi, wj)← {not accept(x,wj) |x ≤
wj
W mi and mi 6= x} (5)
Intuitively (1) means that a man and woman accept each other as partners if they
propose to each other. Due to (2), a man accepts himself as a partner (i.e. stays
single) if no woman in his preference list is prepared to propose to him. Rule (4)
states that a man proposes to a woman if he is not paired to a more or equally
preferred woman. For j ∈ neutraliM the body of (4) contains not accept(mi,mi).
No explicit rules are stated about the number of persons someone can propose to or
accept but as we will see below, in Proposition 1, this is unnecessary. Note that, for
k = max(n, p), the number of grounded rules in the induced ASP program is O(k2).
We now illustrate our approach with an example.
Example 3
Consider the following instance (SM , SW ) of the SMTI. Let M = {m1,m2} and
W = {w1, w2, w3}. Furthermore:
σ1M = ({1}, {2, 3}, {})
σ2M = ({2}, {1})
σ1W = ({1, 2}, {})
σ2W = ({1}, {})
σ3W = ({2}, {1}, {})
The ASP program induced by this SMTI instance is:
accept(X,Y )← manpropose(X,Y ), womanpropose(X,Y )
manpropose(m1, w1)←
manpropose(m1, w2)← not accept(m1, w1), not accept(m1, w3)
manpropose(m1, w3)← not accept(m1, w1), not accept(m1, w2)
accept(m1,m1)← not accept(m1, w1), not accept(m1, w2),
not accept(m1, w3)
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manpropose(m2, w2)←
manpropose(m2, w1)← not accept(m2, w2), not accept(m2,m2)
accept(m2,m2)← not accept(m2, w2), not accept(m2, w1)
womanpropose(m1, w1)← not accept(m2, w1)
womanpropose(m2, w1)← not accept(m1, w1)
accept(w1, w1)← not accept(m1, w1), not accept(m2, w1)
womanpropose(m1, w2)←
accept(w2, w2)← not accept(m1, w2)
womanpropose(m2, w3)←
womanpropose(m1, w3)← not accept(m2, w3)
accept(w3, w3)← not accept(m1, w3), not accept(m2, w3)
If we run the program in DLV, we get three answer sets, containing respectively:
• {accept(m1, w3), accept(m2, w1), accept(w2, w2)},
• {accept(m1, w2), accept(m2, w1), accept(w3, w3)},
• {accept(m1, w1), accept(m2,m2), accept(w2, w2), accept(w3, w3)}.
These answer sets correspond to the three weakly stable matching of marriages of
this SMTI instance, namely {(m1, w3), (m2, w1), (w2, w2)}, {(m1, w2), (m2, w1),
(w3, w3)} and {(m1, w1), (m2,m2), (w2, w2), (w3, w3)}.
The following proposition states that our ASP encoding is sound, i.e. that there
is a bijective correspondence between the answer sets of the induced program and
the weak stable matchings of the SMTI. The complete proof is provided in the
online appendix.
Proposition 1
Let (SM , SW ) be an instance of the SMTI and let P be the corresponding ASP
program. If I is an answer set of P , then a weakly stable matching for (SM , SW ) is
given by {(x, y) | accept(x, y) ∈ I}. Conversely, if {(x1, y1), . . ., (xk, yk)} is a weakly
stable matching for (SM , SW ) then P has the following answer set I:
{manpropose(xi, y) | i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, xi ∈M, y <
xi
M yi ∨ y = yi 6= xi}
∪{womanpropose(x, yi) | i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, yi ∈W,x <
yi
W xi ∨ x = xi 6= yi}
∪{accept(xi, yi) | i ∈ {1, . . . , k}}
A pair (m,w) is stable if there exists a stable matching that contains (m,w).
In (Manlove et al. 2002) it is shown that the decision problem ‘is the pair (m,w)
stable?’ for a given SMTI instance is an NP-complete problem, even in the absence
of unacceptability. It is straightforward to see that we can reformulate this decision
problem as ‘does there exist an answer set of the induced normal ASP program P
which contains the literal accept(m,w)?’ (i.e. brave reasoning), which is known to be
an NP-complete problem (Baral 2003). Thus our model forms a suitable framework
for these kind of decision problems concerning the SMTI.
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3.2 Modeling the 3-Dimensional SMTI in ASP
To illustrate further the flexibility of our ASP approach, we consider a variant of the
SMP and show how small adaptations of the ASP encoding can solve this variant.
Extending the SMP by adding another dimension to the problem was first proposed
in (Knuth 1976). We work out the three-dimensional SMTI, where n men are to
be matched with p women and r children. Definition 1 can straightforwardly be
generalized to a three-dimensional instance (SM , SW , SC), in which preference lists
of the men are defined over the set of woman-child pairs and similarly the women
have preferences over man-child pairs and the children have preferences over man-
woman pairs. In the three-dimensional case, σiM becoms a list of disjoint subsets of
{1, . . . , p}×{1, . . . , r}, and analogously for σjW and σ
k
C . Similarly as before, we can
define the notions of acceptableiM etc. Note that the orderings ≤
mi
M , ≤
wj
W and ≤
ck
C
are resp. defined on pairs in W ×C, M ×C and M ×W . A stable matching is now
defined as a set of man-woman-child triples and singles, with the properties that no
man, woman and child can be found such that each of them prefers the pair formed
by the others above their current mates in the matching and no person prefers
being single to being matched with its current mates. The practical relevance of
this problem is pointed out in (Biro´ and McDermid 2010).
Extending the ASP program from Definition 2, we can write an ASP program
induced by an instance of the three-dimensional matching problem.
Definition 3 (ASP program induced by 3D SMTI )
The ASP program P induced by an instance ({σ1M , . . . , σ
n
M}, {σ
1
W , . . . , σ
p
W }, {σ
1
C ,
. . . , σrC}) of the 3-dimensional SMTI is the program containing the following rules
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, . . . , p} and k ∈ {1, . . . , r}:
accept(mi, wj , ck)← manprop(mi, wj , ck), womprop(mi, wj , ck),
childprop(mi, wj , ck)
accept(mi,mi,mi)← {not accept(mi, wu, cv) | (u, v) ∈ acceptable
i
M}
accept(wj, wj , wj)← {not accept(mu, wj , cv) | (u, v) ∈ acceptable
j
W}
accept(ck, ck, ck)← {not accept(mu, wv, ck) | (u, v) ∈ acceptable
k
C}
and for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and (j, k) ∈ acceptableiM :
manprop(mi, wj , ck)← {not accept(mi, x, y) | (x, y) ≤
mi
M (wj , ck); (wj , ck) 6= (x, y)}
and for every j ∈ {1, . . . , p} and (i, k) ∈ acceptablejW :
womprop(mi, wj , ck)← {not accept(x,wj, y) | (x, y) ≤
wj
W (mi, ck); (mi, ck) 6= (x, y)}
and for every k ∈ {1, . . . , r} and (i, j) ∈ acceptablejC:
childprop(mi, wj , ck)← {not accept(x, u, ck) | (x, y) ≤
ck
C (mi, wj); (mi, wj) 6= (x, y)}
Ng and Hirschberg (Ng and Hirschberg 1991) proved that deciding whether a stable
matching exists for the three-dimensional problem – in the absence of unaccept-
ability and ties – is an NP-complete problem. Completely analogously as for the
two-sided SMP, one can prove that this encoding yields a bijective correspondence
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between the answer sets of the ASP program and the stable matchings of the three-
dimensional matching problem. Note that, for k = max(n, p, r), the number of
grounded rules in the induced ASP program is O(k3).
4 Selecting Optimal Stable Matchings
4.1 Notions of Optimality of Stable Matchings
When several stable matchings can be found for an instance of the SMP, some may
be more interesting than others. The stable matching found by the G-S algorithm is
M-optimal (Roth and Sotomayor 1990), i.e. every man likes this set at least as well
as any other stable matching. Exchanging the roles of men and women in the G-S
algorithm yields a W-optimal stable matching (Gale and Shapley 1962), optimal
from the women’s point of view.
While some applications may require us to favour either the men or the women,
in others it makes more sense to treat both parties equally. To formalize some
commonly considered notions of fairness and optimality w.r.t. the SMP, we define
the cost cx(y) of being matched with y for an individual x, where cx(y) = k if y is
x’s kth preferred partner. More precisely, for a man mi, we define cmi(y) = |{z :
z <miM y}|+1 for every y ∈ acceptable
i
M ; for a woman wj , cwj is defined analogously.
So in case of ties we assign the same list position to equally preferred partners, as
illustrated in Example 4.
Example 4
Let x = m1 be a man with preference list σ
1
M = ({1}, {2, 3}, {4}) then cx(w1) = 1,
cx(w2) = cx(w3) = 2 and w4 yields cx(w4) = 4. The cost for being single would be
4, i.e. cx(m1) = 4, since m1 prefers women w1, w2 and w3 to being single, but is
indifferent between being paired to w4 or staying single.
Definition 4 (Optimal Stable Matchings)
Let S be a set of marriages and let S(x) denote the partner of x in S.
• The sex-equality cost of S is csexeq(S) = |
∑
x∈M cx(S(x))−
∑
x∈W cx(S(x))|,
• the egalitarian cost of S is cweight(S) =
∑
x∈M∪W cx(S(x)),
• the regret cost of S is cregret(S) = maxx∈M∪W cx(S(x)), and
• the cardinality cost of S is csingles(S) = |{z : (z, z) ∈ S}|.
S is a sex-equal stable matching iff S is a stable matching with minimal sex-equality
cost. Similarly, S is an egalitarian (resp. minimum regret, maximum cardinality)
stable matching iff S is a stable matching with minimal egalitarian (resp. regret or
cardinality) cost.
A sex-equal stable matching assigns an equal importance to the preferences of the
men and women, i.e. the men are as pleased with the matching as the women. An
egalitarian stable matching is a stable matching in which the preferences of every
individual are considered to be equally important, i.e. it minimizes the difference in
happiness of all the men and women. In (Xu and Li 2011) the use of an egalitarian
stable matching is proposed to optimally match virtual machines (VM) to servers in
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order to improve cloud computing by equalizing the importance of migration over-
head in the data center network and VM migration performance. A minimum regret
stable matching is optimal for the person who is worst off, i.e. there does not exist
a stable matching such that the person who is most displeased with the matching
is happier than the most displeased person in the minimum regret stable matching.
A maximal or minimal cardinality stable matching is a stable matching with resp.
as few or as many singles as possible. Examples of practical applications include
an efficient kidney exchange program (Roth et al. 2005), which matches donors of
incompatible pairs to recipients of other incompatible pairs and vice versa, and
the National Resident Matching Program (www.nrmp.org) (Manlove et al. 2002),
which matches healthcare professionals to graduate medical education and advanced
training programs. Maximizing cardinality guarantees that as many recipients as
possible will get a compatible donor and as many healthcare professionals as pos-
sible will get a position.
Remark 1
It might be somewhat confusing that the term utilitarian is more frequently used
in sociological and economical contexts for an optimization of the overall happiness
(here called egalitarian), while egalitarian is more used for an optimization which
minimizes the unhappiness of the individuals (tending more to minimum regret).
However, we will use the cost terms as defined above, since these are standard in
the context of the SMP.
For an overview of literature results concerning the computational complexity of
finding optimal stable matchings in the SMP, SMI, SMT and SMTI, we refer to the
online appendix.
Note that other notions of preferred matchings have been described in the litera-
ture, such as popularity (Ga¨rdenfors 1975), Pareto optimality (Gale and Sotomayor 1985;
Roth and Sotomayor 1990) or profile-based notions such as rank-maximum (Irving 2003),
greedy maximum and generous maximum (Irving 2003). For more details on these
and other optimality criteria, we refer the interested reader to (Manlove 2013) for
an overview.
4.2 Finding Stable Matchings using Disjunctive Naf-free ASP
As we discuss in Section 4.3, we can extend our ASP encoding of the SMTI such that
the optimal stable matchings correspond to the answer sets of an associated ASP
program. In particular, we use the saturation technique (Eiter and Gottlob 1995)
to filter non-optimal answer sets. Intuitively, the idea is to create a program with
3 components: (i) a first part describing the solution candidates, (ii) a second part
also describing the solution candidates since comparison of solutions requires mul-
tiple solution candidates within the same answer set whereas the first part in itself
produces one solution per answer set, (iii) a third part comparing the solutions
described in the first two parts and selecting the preferred solutions by saturation.
It is, however, known that the presence of negation-as-failure can cause problems
when applying saturation. This is due to the fact that rules containing naf-literals
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can be altered in the reduct. To address this issue, we use saturation in combi-
nation with a disjunctive naf-free ASP program instead of the ASP program in
Definition 2. To this end, we use a SAT encoding (Janhunen 2004) of the ASP pro-
gram in Definition 2 and define a disjunctive naf-free ASP program in Definition 5
which selects particular models of the SAT problem.
Note that our original normal program is absolutely tight, i.e. there is no infinite
sequence l1, l2, . . . of literals such that for every i there is a program rule for which
li+1 is a positive body literal and li is in the head (Erdem and Lifschitz 2003). We
use the completion to derive an ASP encoding for finding optimal stable matchings.
The completion of a normal ASP program is a set of propositional formulas. For
every atom a with a← bodyi (i ∈ {1, . . . , k}) all the program rules with head a, the
propositional formula a ≡ body′1 ∨ . . .∨ body
′
k is in the completion of that program,
where body′i is the conjunction of literals derived from bodyi by replacing every
occurrence of ‘not’ with ‘¬’. If an atom a of the program does not occur in any
rule head, then a ≡⊥ is in the completion of the program. Similarly the completion
of the program contains the propositional formula ⊥≡ body′1 ∨ . . . ∨ body
′
l where
the disjunction extends over all the program constraints ← bodyi (i ∈ {1, . . . , l}).
Because our program is absolutely tight, we know that every propositional model
of the completion will correspond to an answer set of the original program and
vice versa (Erdem and Lifschitz 2003). When applied to the induced normal ASP
program in Definition 2, the completion contains the following formulas, for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . , p}:
accept(mi, wj) ≡ manpropose(mi, wj) ∧womanpropose(mi, wj),
accept(mi,mi) ≡
∧
k∈acceptablei
M
¬accept(mi, wk),
accept(wj , wj) ≡
∧
k∈acceptable
j
W
¬accept(mk, wj),
and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ acceptableiM :
manpropose(mi, wj) ≡
∧
x≤
mi
M
wj ,x 6=wj
¬accept(mi, x),
and similarly for all j ∈ {1, . . . , p} and i ∈ acceptablejW :
womanpropose(mi, wj) ≡
∧
x≤
wj
W
mi,x 6=mi
¬accept(x,wj),
and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ unacceptableiM :
manpropose(mi, wj) ≡⊥,
and similarly for all j ∈ {1, . . . , p} and i ∈ unacceptablejW :
womanpropose(mi, wj) ≡⊥ .
Using these formulas, which form the completion of the normal ASP program
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from Definition 2, we can define an equivalent disjunctive ASP program without
negation-as-failure.
Definition 5 (Induced disj. naf-free ASP program)
The disjunctive naf-free ASP programPdisj induced by an SMTI instance (SM , SW )
contains the following rules for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, . . . , p}:
¬accept(mi, wj) ∨manpropose(mi, wj)←
¬accept(mi, wj) ∨ womanpropose(mi, wj)←
accept(mi, wj) ∨ ¬manpropose(mi, wj) ∨ ¬womanpropose(mi, wj)←
For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, l ∈ unacceptableiM , j ∈ acceptable
i
M , x ≤
mi
M wj , x 6= wj
Pdisj contains:
∨
k∈acceptablei
M
accept(mi, wk) ∨ accept(mi,mi)←
¬accept(mi,mi) ∨ ¬accept(mi, wj)←
¬manpropose(mi, wj) ∨ ¬accept(mi, x)←∨
x≤
mi
M
wj ,x 6=wj
accept(mi, x) ∨manpropose(mi, wj)←
¬manpropose(mi, wl)←
and symmetrical for j ∈ {1, . . . , p} and womanpropose.
Note that, for k = max(n, p), the number of grounded rules in the induced naf-free
program is O(k3). The following lemma follows from the fact that the completion
corresponds to the original program (Erdem and Lifschitz 2003).
Lemma 1
Let P be the normal ASP program from Definition 2 and Pdisj the disjunctive ASP
program from Definition 5. It holds that for any answer set I of P there exists an
answer set Idisj of Pdisj such that the atoms of I and Idisj coincide. Conversely for
any answer set Idisj of Pdisj there exists an answer set I of P such that the atoms
of I and Idisj coincide.
4.3 ASP Program to Select Optimal Solutions
Let (SM , SW ) be an SMTI instance with SM = {σ1M , . . . , σ
n
M} and SW = {σ
1
W , . . . ,
σ
p
W }, and let Pnorm be the induced normal ASP program from Definition 2. Our
technique for extending this program to a program that can respectively optimize
for the sex-equality, egalitarian, minimum regret and maximum cardinality criterion
is in each case very similar. We start by explaining it for the case of sex-equality.
Our first step is to add a set of rules that compute the sex-equality cost of a set
of marriages. For every man mi and every x ∈ acceptableiM ∪ {mi} we use the
following rule to determine the cost for mi:
mancost(i, cmi(x))← accept(mi, x) (6)
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and similarly for every wj and every x ∈ acceptable
j
W ∪ {wj}:
womancost(j, cwj (x))← accept(x,wj) (7)
We also use the following rules with i ranging from 1 to n and j from 1 to p:
manweight(Z)← #sum{B,A : mancost(A,B)} = Z,#int(Z) (8)
womanweight(Z)← #sum{B,A : womancost(A,B)} = Z,#int(Z) (9)
sexeq(Z)← manweight(X), womanweight(Y ), Z = X − Y
sexeq(Z)← manweight(X), womanweight(Y ), Z = Y −X (10)
Note that #sum, #max, #int and #count are DLV aggregate functions (Faber et al. 2008).
The ‘A’ mentioned as variable in #sum indicates that a cost must be included for
every person (otherwise the cost is included only once when persons have the same
cost). Rule (8) determines the sum of the male costs and similarly (9) determines
the sum of the female costs. According to Definition 4 the absolute difference of
these values yields the sex-equality cost, as determined by rules (10). Since numeric
variables are restricted to positive integers in DLV, we omit conditions as ‘X ≥ Y ’
or ‘X < Y ’. The program Pnorm extended with rules (6) – (10) is denoted P
sexeq
ext .
We construct a program Psexeq, composed by subprograms, that selects optimal
solutions. Let P ′disj be the disjunctive naf-free ASP program, induced by the same
SMTI instance, in which a prime symbol is added to all literal names (e.g. accept
becomes accept′). Define a new program P ′sexeqext with all the rules of P
′
disj in which
every occurrence of ¬atom is changed into natom for every atom atom, i.e. replace
all negation symbols by a prefix ‘n’. For every occurring atom atom in P ′sexeqext , add
the following rule to exclude non-consistent solutions:
sat← atom, natom (11)
For instance, the rule sat← accept′(m1, w1), naccept
′(m1, w1) is added. Finally add
rules (6) – (10) with prime symbols to the literal names to P ′sexeqext but replace rule
(8) and rule (9) by:
mansum′(n,X)← mancost′(n,X)
mansum′(J, Z)← mansum′(I,X),mancost′(J, Y ), Z = X + Y,#succ(J, I)
manweight′(Z)← mansum′(1, Z)
womansum′(p,X)← womancost′(p,X)
womansum′(J, Z)← womansum′(I,X), womancost′(J, Y ), Z = X + Y,
#succ(J, I)
womanweight′(Z)← womansum′(1, Z) (12)
The DLV aggregate function #succ(J, I) is true whenever J+1 = I. We replace the
rules with the aggregate function #max by these rules to make sure the saturation
happens correctly. When saturation is used, the DLV aggregate functions #max,
#sum and #count would not yield the right criterion values. Moreover, DLV does
not accept these aggregate functions in saturation because of the cyclic dependency
of literals within the aggregate functions created by the rules for saturation. These
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adjusted rules, however, will not pose any problems because of the successive way
they compute the criterion values. This becomes more clear in the proof of Proposi-
tion 2. We define the ASP program Psexeq as the union of P
sexeq
ext , P
′sexeq
ext and Psat.
The ASP program Psat contains the following rules to select minimal solutions
based on sex-equality:
sat← sexeq(X), sexeq′(Y ), X ≤ Y (13)
← not sat (14)
mancost′(X,Y )← sat,manargcost′1(X),manargcost
′
2(Y )
womancost′(X,Y )← sat, womanargcost′1(X), womanargcost
′
2(Y ) (15)
manpropose′(X,Y )← sat,man(X), woman(Y )
womanpropose′(X,Y )← sat,man(X), woman(Y )
accept′(X,X)← sat,man(X)
accept′(X,X)← sat, woman(X)
accept′(X,Y )← sat,man(X), woman(Y ) (16)
and analogous to (16) a set of rules with prefix ‘n’ for the head predicates. Finally we
add the factsmanargcost′1(1..n)←,manargcost
′
2(1..(p+1))←, womanargcost
′
1(1..p)←,
womanargcost′2(1..(n + 1)) ←, man(x) ← for every man x and woman(x) ← for
every woman x to Psat. The rule manargcost′1(1..n) ← is DLV syntax for the n
facts manargcost′1(1) ←, . . . ,manargcost
′
1(n) ←. Intuitively the rules of Psat ex-
press the key idea of saturation. First every answer set is forced to contain the
atom sat by rule (14). Then the rules (15) – (16) and the facts make sure that
any answer set should contain all possible literals with a prime symbol that occur
in Psexeq. Rule (13) will establish that only optimal solutions will correspond to
minimal models and thus lead to answer sets. For any non-optimal solution, the
corresponding interpretation containing sat will never be a minimal model of the
reduct. It is formally proven in Proposition 2 below that Psexeq produces exactly
the stable matchings with minimal sex-equality cost.
Furthermore, only small adjustments to Psexeq are needed to create programs
Pweight, Pregret, and Psingles that respectively produce egalitarian, minimum regret
and maximum cardinality stable matchings. Indeed, the ASP program Pweight can
easily be defined as Psexeq in which the predicates sexeq and sexeq
′ are respectively
replaced by weight and weight′ and the rules (10) are replaced by (17), determining
the egalitarian cost of Definition 4 as the sum of the male and female costs:
weight(Z)← manweight(X), womanweight(Y ), Z = X + Y (17)
Similarly the ASP program Pregret is defined as Psexeq in which the predicates
sexeq and sexeq′ are resp. replaced by regret and regret′ and rules (8) – (10) are
replaced by the following rules:
manregret(Z)← #max{B : mancost(A,B)} = Z,#int(Z) (18)
womanregret(Z)← #max{B : womancost(A,B)} = Z,#int(Z) (19)
regret(X)← manregret(X), womanregret(Y ), X > Y
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regret(Y )← manregret(X), womanregret(Y ), X ≤ Y (20)
Rule (18) determines the regret cost but only for the men. Similarly (19) determines
the regret cost for the women. The regret cost as defined in Definition 4 is the
maximum of these two values, determined by the rules in (20). Again we adjust
rules (18) and (19) for the program part P ′regretext by replacing them with a variant
based on the successor function:
manmax′(n,X)← mancost′(n,X)
manmax′(J,X)← manmax′(I,X),mancost′(J, Y ), X ≥ Y,#succ(J, I)
manmax′(J, Y )← manmax′(I,X),mancost′(J, Y ), X < Y,#succ(J, I)
manregret′(Z)← manmax′(1, Z)
womanmax′(p,X)← womancost′(p,X)
womanmax′(J,X)← womanmax′(I,X), womancost′(J, Y ), X ≥ Y,#succ(J, I)
womanmax′(J, Y )← womanmax′(I,X), womancost′(J, Y ), X < Y,#succ(J, I)
womanregret′(Z)← womanmax′(1, Z) (21)
Finally we define the ASP program Psingles as Psexeq in which the predicates
sexeq and sexeq′ are resp. replaced by singles and singles′. Furthermore we replace
rules (6) – (10) by (22), determining the number of singles:
singles(Z)← #count{B : accept(B,B)} = Z,#int(Z) (22)
This time we adjust rule (22) for the program part P ′singlesext as follows:
single′(p+ i, 1)← accept′(mi,mi), single
′(p+ i, 0)← naccept′(mi,mi)
single′(j, 1)← accept′(wj , wj), single
′(j, 0)← naccept′(wj , wj)
singlesum′(n+ p,X)← single′(n+ p,X)
singlesum′(J, Z)← singlesum′(I,X), single′(J, Y ), Z = X + Y,#succ(J, I)
singles′(Z)← singlesum′(1, Z) (23)
Note that, for k = max(n, p), the number of grounded rules in the induced ASP
program is O(k3) for minimum regret and maximum cardinality, but O(k4) for sex-
equalness and egalitarity. The latter programs have a higher number of grounded
rules because of how the weights are counted in the first and second program part.
We illustrate our method with an example.
Example 5
We reconsider Example 3. This SMTI instance had 3 stable matchings of marriages:
• S1 = {accept(m1, w3), accept(m2, w1), accept(w2, w2)},
• S2 = {accept(m1, w2), accept(m2, w1), accept(w3, w3)},
• S3 = {accept(m1, w1), accept(m2,m2), accept(w2, w2), accept(w3, w3)}.
It is easy to compute the respective regret costs as cregret(S1) = 2 and cregret(S2) =
cregret(S3) = 3. The corresponding ASP program selecting this minimum regret
stable matching is the program consisting of the rules in Example 3 in addition to:
man(m1)←, man(m2)←,
Solving SMP using ASP 17
woman(w1)←, woman(w2)←, woman(w3)←
mancost(1, 1)← accept(m1, w1), womancost(1, 1)← accept(m1, w1)
mancost(1, 2)← accept(m1, w2), womancost(1, 1)← accept(m2, w1)
mancost(1, 2)← accept(m1, w3), womancost(1, 2)← accept(w1, w1)
mancost(1, 4)← accept(m1,m1), womancost(2, 1)← accept(m1, w2)
mancost(2, 2)← accept(m2, w1), womancost(2, 2)← accept(w2, w2)
mancost(2, 1)← accept(m2, w2), womancost(3, 2)← accept(m1, w3)
mancost(2, 2)← accept(m2,m2), womancost(3, 1)← accept(m2, w3)
womancost(3, 3)← accept(w3, w3)
manregret(Z)← #max{B : mancost(A,B)} = Z,#int(Z)
womanregret(Z)← #max{B : womancost(A,B)} = Z,#int(Z)
regret(X)← manregret(X), womanregret(Y ), X > Y
regret(Y )← manregret(X), womanregret(Y ), X <= Y
naccept′(M,W ) ∨manpropose′(M,W )← man(M),
woman(W )
naccept′(M,W ) ∨ womanpropose′(M,W )← man(M),
woman(W )
accept′(M,W ) ∨ nmanpropose′(M,W ) ∨ nwomanpropose′(M,W )← man(M),
woman(W )
accept′(m1, w1) ∨ accept
′(m1, w2) ∨ accept
′(m1, w3) ∨ accept
′(m1,m1)←
accept′(m2, w1) ∨ accept
′(m2, w2) ∨ accept
′(m2,m2)←
naccept′(m1,m1) ∨ naccept
′(m1, w1)←
naccept′(m1,m1) ∨ naccept
′(m1, w2)←
naccept′(m1,m1) ∨ naccept
′(m1, w3)←
naccept′(m2,m2) ∨ naccept
′(m2, w1)←
naccept′(m2,m2) ∨ naccept
′(m2, w2)←
accept′(m1, w1) ∨ accept
′(m2, w1) ∨ accept
′(w1, w1)←
accept′(m1, w2) ∨ accept
′(w2, w2)←
accept′(m1, w3) ∨ accept
′(m2, w3) ∨ accept
′(w3, w3)←
naccept′(w1, w1) ∨ naccept
′(m1, w1)←
naccept′(w1, w1) ∨ naccept
′(m2, w1)←
naccept′(w2, w2) ∨ naccept
′(m1, w2)←
naccept′(w3, w3) ∨ naccept
′(m1, w3)←
naccept′(w3, w3) ∨ naccept
′(m2, w3)←
nmanpropose′(m1, w2) ∨ naccept
′(m1, w1)←
nmanpropose′(m1, w2) ∨ naccept
′(m1, w3)
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nmanpropose′(m1, w3) ∨ naccept
′(m1, w1)←
nmanpropose′(m1, w3) ∨ naccept
′(m1, w2)←
manpropose′(m1, w1)←
accept′(m1, w1) ∨ accept
′(m1, w3) ∨manpropose
′(m1, w2)←
accept′(m1, w1) ∨ accept
′(m1, w2) ∨manpropose
′(m1, w3)←
nmanpropose′(m2, w1) ∨ naccept
′(m2, w2)←
nmanpropose′(m2, w1) ∨ naccept
′(m2,m2)←
manpropose′(m2, w2)←
accept′(m2, w2) ∨ accept
′(m2,m2) ∨manpropose
′(m2, w1)←
nwomanpropose′(m1, w1) ∨ naccept
′(m2, w1)←
nwomanpropose′(m2, w1) ∨ naccept
′(m1, w1)←
accept′(m1, w1) ∨ womanpropose
′(m2, w1)←
accept′(m2, w1) ∨ womanpropose
′(m1, w1)←
womanpropose′(m1, w2)←
nwomanpropose′(m1, w3) ∨ naccept
′(m2, w3)←
womanpropose′(m2, w3)←
accept′(m2, w3) ∨ womanpropose
′(m1, w3)←
nmanpropose′(m2, w3)←
nwomanpropose′(m2, w2)←
sat← manpropose′(X,Y ), nmanpropose′(X,Y ),man(X),
woman(Y )
sat← womanpropose′(X,Y ), nwomanpropose′(X,Y ),
man(X), woman(Y )
sat← accept′(X,Y ), naccept′(X,Y ),man(X), woman(Y )
sat← accept′(X,X), naccept′(X,X),man(X)
sat← accept′(X,X), naccept′(X,X), woman(X)
mancost′(1, 1)← accept′(m1, w1), womancost
′(1, 1)← accept′(m1, w1)
mancost′(1, 2)← accept′(m1, w2), womancost
′(1, 1)← accept′(m2, w1)
mancost′(1, 2)← accept′(m1, w3), womancost
′(1, 2)← accept′(w1, w1)
mancost′(1, 4)← accept′(m1,m1), womancost
′(2, 1)← accept′(m1, w2)
mancost′(2, 2)← accept′(m2, w1), womancost
′(2, 2)← accept′(w2, w2)
mancost′(2, 1)← accept′(m2, w2), womancost
′(3, 2)← accept′(m1, w3)
mancost′(2, 2)← accept′(m2,m2), womancost
′(3, 1)← accept′(m2, w3)
womancost′(3, 3)← accept′(w3, w3)
manmax′(2, X)← mancost′(2, X)
manmax′(J,X)← manmax′(I,X),mancost′(J, Y ), X >= Y,#succ(J, I)
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manmax′(J,X)← manmax′(I,X),mancost′(J, Y ), X >= Y,#succ(J, I)
manregret′(Z)← manmax′(1, Z)
womanmax′(3, X)← womancost′(3, X)
womanmax′(J,X)← womanmax′(I,X), womancost′(J, Y ), X >= Y,
#succ(J, I)
womanmax′(J,X)← womanmax′(I,X), womancost′(J, Y ), X >= Y,
#succ(J, I)
womanregret′(Z)← womanmax′(1, Z)
regret′(X)← manregret′(X), womanregret′(Y ), X > Y
regret′(Y )← manregret′(X), womanregret′(Y ), X <= Y
sat← regret(X), regret′(Y ), X <= Y
← not sat
manargcost′1(1..2)←, womanargcost
′
1(1..3)←
manargcost′2(1..4)←, womanargcost
′
2(1..3)←
mancost′(X,Y )← sat,manargcost′1(X),manargcost
′
2(Y )
womancost′(X,Y )← sat, womanargcost′1(X), womanargcost
′
2(Y )
manpropose′(X,Y )← sat,man(X), woman(Y )
nmanpropose′(X,Y )← sat,man(X), woman(Y )
womanpropose′(X,Y )← sat,man(X), woman(Y )
nwomanpropose′(X,Y )← sat,man(X), woman(Y )
accept′(X,Y )← sat,man(X), woman(Y )
accept′(X,X)← sat,man(X)
accept′(X,X)← sat, woman(X)
naccept′(X,Y )← sat,man(X), woman(Y )
naccept′(X,X)← sat,man(X)
naccept′(X,X)← sat, woman(X)
Computing the unique answer set of this disjunctive ASP program with DLV and
filtering it to the literals accept and regret, yields {accept(m2, w1), accept(m1, w3),
accept(w2, w2), regret(2)}, corresponding exactly to the minimum regret stable
matching S1 of the SMTI instance and the corresponding regret cost.
We prove that there exists a bijective correspondence between the answer sets
of the induced disjunctive ASP program and the optimal stable matchings of the
SMTI (see the online appendix).
Proposition 2
Let the criterion crit be an element of {sexeq, weight, regret, singles}. For every
answer set I of the program Pcrit induced by an SMTI instance the set SI =
{(m,w) | accept(m, w) ∈ I} forms an optimal stable matching of marriages w.r.t.
criterion crit and the optimal criterion value is given by the unique value vI for
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which crit(vI) ∈ I. Conversely for every optimal stable matching S = {(x1, y1), . . . ,
(xk, yk)} with optimal criterion value v there exists an answer set I of Pcrit such
that {(x, y) | accept(x, y) ∈ I} = {(xi, yi) | i ∈ {1, . . . , k}} and v is the unique value
for which crit(v) ∈ I.
Remark 2
If we remove from Psexeq the rules (9) – (10) and replace rule (13) by the rule
sat ← manweight(X), manweight′(Y ), X ≤ Y , then we obtain the M-optimal
stable matchings. Analogously we can obtain the W-optimal stable matchings.
If a criterion is to be maximized, the symbol ≤ in rule (13) is simply replaced
by ≥. E.g. for crit = singles we will get minimum cardinality stable matchings.
5 Conclusion
We have shown how ASP programs can be used to encode a number of variations
and generalizations of the SMP. Apart from the availability of efficient ASP solvers,
the main advantage of our approach is its flexibility, allowing us to find solutions
for a wide range of stable matching problems. We can, for instance, compute stable
matchings of variants such as the three-dimensional stable matching problem, as
well as select stable matchings based on optimality criteria, even for problems with
unacceptable partners and ties. We have illustrated our method for sex-equality,
egalitarity, minimum regret and maximum cardinality, but the approach can read-
ily be adapted to other optimality criteria (e.g. popular matchings) or to different
matching problems (e.g. the roommate problem). To the best of our knowledge,
no other exact algorithms exist to find an optimal stable matching for an SMP
instance with ties, regardless of the presence of unacceptability and regardless of
whether the optimality notion is sex-equality, egalitarity, minimum regret or maxi-
mum cardinality. Therefore, our encoding offers the first exact implementation for
solving the aforementioned problems.
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